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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Cybersecurity at the International 
Hellenic University for the period of the academic year 2018 - 2021.  The objective of 
this academic effort is to delve into cloud storage forensics concepts and better under-
stand the topics related to the cyber security, as described in the following five thesis 
chapters: 
• In Chapter 1, an overview of this work is introduced. 
• In Chapter 2, the basics of the cloud computing and its available models are present-
ed.  
• In Chapter 3, we discuss about cybercrime and the cloud storage forensics proce-
dure, the cloud challenges faced by the forensic investigators and we briefly present 
the currently available acquisition tools. 
• In Chapter 4, an experiment is conducted. It consists of three suspicious cloud stor-
ages packed with files that are acquired to the investigator’s cloud storage VM. Dur-
ing this process, the integrity and speed of the acquisition are checked in order to 
prove that cloud acquisition is forensically safe. 
• In Chapter 5, all the conclusions of this thesis are presented. 
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1 Introduction 
There is no doubt that cloud storage has emerged in recent years as an important option 
for storing individuals’ or companies’ growing collection of digital data online, as it al-
lows unlimited storage with guaranteed affordability and easy accessibility, from any-
where in the world. While cloud storage and cloud computing in general, offer real ad-
vantages to legitimate users, they also create vast opportunities for malicious actors who 
intent to commit various criminal acts, such as child exploitation, financial crime, cyber 
terrorism etc. (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), 
(12.Ujwala, 2019). 
Historically, many companies were depended on their in-house servers for storing their 
data and access to computing devices was fairly easy, with the traditional access to in-
formation held on these devices to be relatively straightforward. With the spread of 
smart mobile devices and data sharing and storage opportunities, the challenge around 
accessing and securing data for forensic examination is constantly evolving. Specifical-
ly, forensic computing has shifted from the traditional approach that was involving the 
seizure and analysis of digital evidence to a new and one, where data can be hosted 
abroad and thus poses significant challenges for forensic investigators. (04. Darren 
Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), (13.Mark Taylor, John 
Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
Undoubtedly, we live in the era of the Internet of Things (IoT), where devices like 
smartphones, tablets and computers are frequently involved in digital crimes. Forensic 
examination of such devices, especially when they relate to cybercrime investigations 
can reveal evidence that is vital for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA). Thus, forensic 
investigators must be fully aware about the digital forensic processes and the most suit-
able tools required to perform effective digital forensic examinations.  
The digital forensic process comprises of a number of steps like acquisition, examina-
tion, analysis, and reporting, while authenticity and integrity are the two fundamental 
principles that can offer credibility to the whole process, especially when such a process 
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relates with criminal proceedings. (09.Mahmoud M. Nasreldin, Magdy El-Hennawy, 
Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 2015). 
Despite the advantages of cloud architecture, such technology we cannot ignore its 
characteristics that pose challenges for the forensic investigators. These characteristics 
are the lack of well-defined physical characteristics, different service, and deployment 
models as well as that the cloud data is stored and controlled remotely from its users 
and only accessible via particular cloud’s software, platform, or infrastructure. Addi-
tionally, the traditional disk cloning methods might be not feasible for acquiring digital 
evidence in the cloud, due to the increased amounts of data held there, distributed stor-
age or the shared hosting. Shared hosting is common in cloud environments and may 
contain both normal and malicious data. The latter may of course be of particular inter-
est to law enforcement authorities. Hence, the simplistic approach to trust a system ad-
ministrator to seek, preserve, and disclose relevant data to investigators is against the 
protection of the privacy of the irrelevant user and jeopardizes the investigation process 
(09.Mahmoud M. Nasreldin, Magdy El-Hennawy, Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 
2015), (13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
Meanwhile, cloud forensics is a field that has not researched adequately and there are 
not many practical approaches available for the acquisition and analysis of cloud evi-
dence, while any existing approaches are slight adaptations of traditional methods and 
tools. In fact, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) which is the 
primary standardization organization in the U.S.A., still attempts to reach a consensus 
on the challenges involved to perform cloud data forensics (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet 
Shenoi (Eds.), 2016). 
With the emergence and omnipresent access to cloud storage, the research presented in 
this dissertation is helpful understanding cloud storage forensics and the proper use of 
scientific methods for the identification, preservation, acquisition, and documentation of 
data evidence derived from cloud storages. This study focuses mainly on a specific 
problem and that is the acquisition of data from three popular cloud storage services: 
Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive, and Dropbox. Cloud storage services are extremely 
popular offering consumers between 2GB and 15GB of gratis cloud storage which is 
widely used by mobile devices to share data and functionalities across applications. 
Consequently, a robust evidence acquisition method is a requirement, and it should be 
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adaptable and extensible in order to keep pace with the wide range of rapid evolving 
cloud storage services. 
Furthermore, we illustrate an experiment intending to introduce an adaptable and exten-
sible tool that allows us to collect, organize, and preserve electronic evidence. This 
method utilizes API advantages to identify user’s cloud account details and also consid-
ers the client-side shortcomings. The goal of the proposed concept is to ensure that the 
investigation of the acquired digital evidence is forensically sound and demonstrate that 
the cloud is able to support digital forensic investigations ensuring integrity and confi-
dentiality of the acquired data. It is hoped that this work will become a link between 
digital forensic and cloud computing, and it will contribute towards a better understand-
ing of the evidence acquisition methods and tools, as well as the types of artifacts that 
are likely to remain in cloud storages. 
In summary, the cloud is described as a dynamic and complicated environment in many 
respects such as how and where data is stored and processed, user activities and access-
es, service providers’ roles and control over the Cloud, and on the legal aspect, jurisdic-
tions, and legislation issues, among others. Hence, new standards and protocols relating 
to the identification, preservation, acquisition, and analysis of cloud-based evidence are 
becoming increasingly important as individuals and enterprises progressively require 
computer forensic services or investigations (10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An 
Le‐Khac, 2019), (13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
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2 Cloud Essentials 
Cloud technology constantly rises and becomes the leading model for information tech-
nology (IT) services delivered to Internet-connected devices as it offers cloud storage 
and computing features that have considerably augmented productivity and life quality 
in numerous ways. Such technologies enable trustworthy, scalable, adaptable, and prof-
itable data storage and processing through network interconnected systems, databases, 
and virtual environments (10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 2019). Un-
deniably, the most significant characteristic of cloud is the abstraction of physical com-
puting and communications infrastructure that empowers individuals and enterprises to 
use services in a pay-per-use basis instead of owning and maintaining their own infra-
structure. (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016).  
2.1 The acceptance of the Cloud. 
The first cloud services were delivered as a SaaS (Software as a Service, a term to be 
described later) model in the late 1990s although, they were not considered cloud com-
puting services. Nowadays, we are witnessing a noticeable increase of cloud computing 
usage due to the popularity and the availability of cloud storage services that allow con-
sumers to store data that are accessible via a wide range of devices, such as personal 
computers, tablets, and mobile phones. Also, there are many cloud storage hosting pro-
viders like Dropbox, Microsoft Onedrive, and Google Drive that offer free cloud stor-
age services (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
However, the key difference is that there are currently wide-area network (WAN) infra-
structures with considerably higher bandwidth, which results to almost instantaneous 
file synchronization and other online cloud operations. (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet 
Shenoi (Eds.), 2016). 
Since 2016, when Amazon introduced its first cloud service product called Amazon 
Web Services, the cloud hosted landscape has drastically changed. Nowadays, 93% of 
businesses somehow use cloud approaches, while 87% adopt a hybrid strategy that 
combines multiple cloud providers in a public-private configuration. Additionally, 
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during the COVID-19 era, a rising of 59% of cloud adoption was withnessed due to 
world’s increased online computing needs (14.Flexera, 2020). Nevertheless, numerous 
open and closed source cloud software products have been developed to meet the needs 
of the enterprises and individuals who want to take advantage of the cloud computing 
benefits while continue to store data on-site. Storing data on-site and in physical 
jurisdiction are progressively seen as techniques that reduce some of the location risks 
that cloud storage service clients currently face. As an example, many enterprises are 
sceptical about moving their data into the public cloud for several reasons. Security and 
control over data, and legal obligations in terms of cloud providers failing to comply 
with data protection legislation and thus raise administrative, civil, and criminal 
penalties are only some of them (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond 
Choo, 2014). Such obstacles can also be considered the basic elements that prevent 
cloud computing from fully adopted by the IT  industry. (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan 
Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016). 
2.2 The Cloud models. 
According to U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) definition, 
there are five essential characteristics that differentiate the cloud service model from 
prior ones. These characteristics are on-demand self-service, broad network access, re-
source pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres 
Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 2016, 15.NIST (Peter Mell,Timothy Grance), 2011). Specifically, 
a Cloud Services Provider (CSP) may offer a plethora of services to clients, allowing 
them to interact with the cloud environment in a variety of ways. These services consist 
of the following broadly accepted cloud service models: Software as a Service (SaaS), 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) (04. Darren Quick, 
Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
However, this classification, although widely adopted, is rather simplistic. In actual de-
ployments, the distinctions are often less obvious, and most IT cloud solutions often 
combine elements of all of these. As illustrated in Picture 1, it is convenient to decom-
pose a cloud computing environment into a stack of layers such as: hardware, virtualiza-
tion, operating system, middleware, runtime environment, data, and application. It is 
worth noticing that depending on the deployment setup, different layers may be man-
aged by different parties (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016). 
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Picture 1: Cloud service models and ownership of layers (public cloud). 
 
2.2.1 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
According to this model, cloud service providers own all the layers including applica-
tion layer that runs the software offered as a service to customers on a subscription or 
pay-per-use basis. The applications are accessed remotely from computers or mobile 
devices that use suitable cloud interface software, and the customer's device acts like a 
portal to the software and data stored in the cloud. As a result, customers have only in-
direct, incomplete or no control over the core operating infrastructure and application 
policies. However, as cloud service providers (CSP) manage the infrastructure (applica-
tions included), the maintenance expense on customer side is considerably reduced. 
Popular examples of SaaS are Google Gmail/Docs, Microsoft 365, Citrix GoToMeeting, 
and Cisco WebEx. These services run directly from a web browser without the need to 
download and install any extra software (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres 
Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016,  13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, 
David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
2.2.2 Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
The PaaS service model allows the customer to rent a development environment, gain-
ing access to the computer platform or operating systems of the cloud instances (e.g., 
Windows and Linux) and to an underlying database in order to create or acquire appli-
cations using software components built into middleware. In this scenario, the cloud in-
frastructure actually hosts customer developed applications and provides high-level ser-
vices that simplify the development process. Popular examples of PaaS are Apache 
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Stratos, Amazon Web Services Elastic Beanstalk and Google App Engine. All of them 
offer quick and cost-effective solutions for developing, testing, and deploying customer 
applications (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, 
Vivek Shanmughan, 2016,  04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond 
Choo, 2014). 
2.2.3 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
In the IaaS model, the CSP manages the virtual machines in accordance with customer 
requests. In fact, the customer hires the hardware equipment on a subscription or pay-
per-use basis and is responsible to installing the operating system and applications that 
match its needs. There is no intervention of the CSP to the software level operations. 
This approach allows clients to manage storage space, bandwidth, and other expandable 
computing services, and thus allow them to install and execute the applications they 
prefer within the cloud infrastructure. Amazon Web Service (AWS), Microsoft Azure, 
Google Compute Engine (GCE) are indicative examples of IaaS (03.Vassil Roussev*, 
Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016,  04. Darren 
Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
2.3 Benefits of the cloud and use of online storage. 
It is evident that cloud computing is generally considered as the next transformational 
wave and a completely new concept in Information Technology (IT) for business, gov-
ernments, and individual consumers, which allows sharing, exchange, and processing of 
information via solid infrastructures and networks. Furthermore, it is pushing innova-
tion creating new business models and pioneering improvements of IT domain for all 
users (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014),  (10.Lei 
Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 2019). Undoubtably, cloud computing pro-
vides trustworthy access to distributed resources with instant accessibility, scalability, 
reduction of maintenance costs, while it guarantees data, and service availability. Nota-
bly, cloud computing has changed the software development ethics. Traditionally, soft-
ware business models have been following the Software as a Product (SaaP) approach, 
meaning that software was purchased as a physical product whose owner could use for 
an unlimited period. Contrarily, Software as a Service (SaaS) is subscription based. It 
was originally offered by Application Service Providers (ASPs) back in the 1990s. It is 
worth noticing that migrating from SaaP to SaaS moves the responsibility for operating 
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the software and its environment from the customer to the provider (09.Mahmoud M. 
Nasreldin, Magdy El-Hennawy, Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 2015) (03.Vassil 
Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016). 
The use of cloud computing and storage, diminishes the requirement for most individu-
als and organizations to acquire hardware and software that is not entirely used, as was 
the case in the past. As an alternative, users and enterprises may lease, instead of own 
and maintain, to provided cloud services offering as much compute capacity as needed 
as they simply need terminal systems for the purpose of human interaction while driving 
most computing and storage to the Cloud. In this sense, a major role has been portrayed 
by distributed file systems and object stores, which allowed to achieve practically infi-
nite storage capacity (10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 2019), 
(03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek 
Shanmughan, 2016), (01.Corradο Federici, 2014). 
Furthermore, cloud computing and especially cloud storage services available at rea-
sonable costs to customers, organizations, and companies, have provided them with 
enormous quantities of data storage space and immense computing capabilities. Service 
providers such as Microsoft, Dropbox, and Google all have cloud service plans in order 
to provide small businesses advantageous access to capabilities that large corporations 
often manipulate internally, hence offering the benefits of scale economies to small 
businesses and making them more competing (10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An 
Le‐Khac, 2019). Enumerating Cloud data storage advantages for people, organizations, 
and companies, the following benefits of online data storage are surfacing (07.Aaron 
Wheeler, Michael Winburn, 2015), (12.Ujwala, 2019): 
• Usability, accessibility, and convenience 
Cloud storages support the drag and drop feature thus files are easily transferred in 
the cloud storage without any special required technical knowledge, and they are ef-
fortlessly accessed worldwide with just an internet connection. Furthermore, the 
benefits offered by online cloud storages enable users to entirely focus on their 
work without watching about data loss. No manual intervention and physical han-
dling such as to save, label or track information are required because Information 
is automatically saved and backed up online in order to be accessed from anywhere. 
• Easy Sharing and Collaboration. 
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Online cloud storage is also an ideal platform for teamwork purposes. Share access 
can be granted in an easy and secure way for multiple people such as clients and 
colleagues. In this particular cloud environment, people are able to access, edit and 
collaborate on stored files from anywhere in the world. 
• Synchronization 
It is evident that using the traditional local file storage, data can only be recovered 
and accessible from certain limited locations. On the contrary, with cloud storage, 
accessing files and synchronizing them, is feasible effortlessly with a plethora of 
devices such as PCs, smartphones, and tablets, through an internet connection. Con-
sequently, the tedious task of transferring data among devices is lessened as it can 
get complex at certain times. The files kept in the cloud storage can be automatically 
updated after being changed or updated. They are immediately synchronized across 
all the devices hence users can always access the latest version of the updated file 
through cloud storage. 
• Disaster Recovery and Security. 
Having a backup plan in case of an emergency or disaster, is a necessity in order to 
avoid losing crucial data that might cause enormous financial damages. There is no 
doubt that off-site backup of critical data is considered to be a great backup plan 
when stored files are located at a remote cloud storage so they can be recovered and 
accessible at any time. Likewise, data is kept in the cloud safely since it is encrypted 
and transmitted using Secure Layer Socket (SSL) methods. Another advantage of 
using cloud storage is that hosted data is distributed across redundant servers and it 
is safeguarded against any type of hardware failure via automated backups 
and snapshots. The major concern for enterprises is creating data backups in a man-
ner that everyday operations do not get obstructed. Creating and scheduling the 
backup using the cloud storage technology, is a simplified task through automation. 
All that is required is selecting what data to backup, when, and then the cloud envi-
ronment will take care all the details.  
• Expense Savings and Scalable Service. 
Studies have demonstrated that outsourcing to the cloud can drastically reduce an-
nual organizations’ operating costs because internal power and resources are not re-
quired for storing the precious corporate data. Moreover, cloud hosting allows scal-
ing and guarantees more flexibility and large storage space. Individuals and busi-
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nesses only pay for the resources that they actually use, and they are able to level 
their cloud hosting environment whenever necessary. 
While there are considerable benefits to adapt cloud computing, there are also some 
drawbacks that should be considered. The storage and organization of data, compared to 
the traditional computing environment, has changed from local or conventional net-
works to the Cloud. As a result, data most likely is not stored on a single server and at a 
single location. It may span across more than one jurisdictional territory and in case of a 
Cybercrime event, there are significant challenges to digital investigations for Law En-
forcement Agencies [LEA] (12.Ujwala, 2019). Since Cloud forensics and particularly 
cloud storage acquisition is the main subject of this dissertation, feasible approaches and 
technics are going to be analyzed in the following chapters. 
2.4 The future of the Cloud. 
Overall, it seems that cloud computing is already an everyday reality consisting of ser-
vices that are provided in an analogous way to traditional ones, such as gas, electricity, 
water, and telephony services. It is worth to be mentioned that customers do not bother 
themselves to know details as where the services are hosted or how they are provided to 
the extent that they are capable to run Web-based software of their choice and access 
applications from anywhere in the world using on demand techniques. The cloud is the 
next big step for the industry because it enables the end user to simplify the complicated 
nature of operating with IT. 
Such a change cannot not be ignored and instead should be beneficial for individuals 
and enterprises. The capability of the cloud to solve the challenging task of allowing 
end users to fully control technology while lowering costs to the business (e.g. equip-
ment, support, maintenance, manpower.) is revolutionary. It is probable that cloud com-
puting will change the approaches in which an organization realizes its Information 
Technology (IT) needs. The latter transfers its data and processing to a cloud to reach 
high availability and access speed via virtualized servers, which provide on-demand 
computing power in a very low-cost manner while optimizing the modern cloud. More-
over, when bound to an ever faster and widely available Internet, the cloud will contin-
ue to enable end users to utilize always connected Web devices and build more servers 
and use more cloud-based applications. 
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On the other hand, cloud security is the main concern of customers in the cloud and 
many individuals and companies still resist IT migration to the cloud. Cloud infrastruc-
ture and its components need to be secured and managed by specialized personnel be-
cause we are in the early stages of a mega transformation and as the cloud reveals itself, 
it will present a whole new set of risks, challenges, and opportunities  (05.Terrence V. 
Lillard, Clint P. Garrison, Craig A. Schiller, James “Jim” Steele, 2010),  (09.Mahmoud 
M. Nasreldin, Magdy El-Hennawy, Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 2015). 
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3 Cybercrime and Forensics 
for the Cloud storage. 
Cloud computing is a whole new technology advancement that not only provides the 
widespread convenience of inexpensive cloud computing services for data storage, but 
it also accumulates a vast amount of information. As a consequence, it additionally pos-
es new privacy and security concerns leading individuals, enterprises, and governments 
to be highly concerned about (01.Corradο Federici, 2014), (04. Darren Quick, Ben Mar-
tini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), (07.Aaron Wheeler, Michael Winburn, 2015).  
3.1 Cloud computing is subject to attacks. 
As well as any other networked cyber infrastructure, cloud computing is subject to at-
tacks by cyber criminals, who conduct their unlawful activities in a variety of new types 
of exploitation, intending to expand their illegal activities through or in the Cloud. 
There is no doubt, there has been an increase in the sophistication and volume of mali-
cious cyber activities that allows threat actors to hijack and use cyberspace resources in 
order to facilitate and enhance usual forms of criminality as well as to create new meth-
ods of crime  (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), 
(10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 2019). 
Commonly found cybercrimes and illegal cyber activities include exploitation of the 
cloud infrastructure to launch new attacks to other IT systems, or to store, hide and dis-
tribute illegal data possessed by cyber criminals, organized crime groups, and politically 
motivated persons, avoiding an investigation by law enforcement agencies. Such crimes 
include, but not limited to, internet banking and credit card fraud, identity theft and data 
theft, business espionage, cyberterrorism, money laundering and the nowadays increas-
ing child pornography and online child exploitation activities like child grooming and 
propagation of child abuse and exploitative material, among others  (04. Darren Quick, 
Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), (10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, 
Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 2019). 
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3.2 The cloud computing nature. 
Because of the cloud computing nature, the storage system is not locally maintained, 
and criminal’s or victim’s data of interest may be geographically dispersed, virtualized, 
or ephemeral on increasing volumes of digital evidence, posing technical and jurisdic-
tional challenges for identification and seizure by law enforcement agencies (04. Darren 
Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). Particularly, each cloud server 
or host contains files from various users, and it is not an easy task to identify data that 
belongs to a certain suspect and to distinct it from other users’ documents. In practice, 
an individual or an organization may not know where data, for which it is responsible, is 
geographically located at any certain time despite the fact that some public cloud ser-
vice providers do provide regional data storage options e.g. US and EU data centers 
(09.Mahmoud M. Nasreldin, Magdy El-Hennawy, Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 
2015), (13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011).  
There is no doubt, the third-party location can have a significant effect on the investiga-
tory jurisdiction and responsibility because of terms of use, legal warrants, and dissimi-
lar laws across geographic jurisdictions that are increasing the possibility that cloud 
platforms potentially host evidence of criminal activity. Furthermore, since there is no 
standard way, other than the cloud provider’s guarantee to link given evidence to a par-
ticular suspect, the credibility of the evidence is also doubtful. These challenges may 
have a major impact on acquiring digital evidence and forensically analyzing digital 
content in a timely manner. Forensic investigators and law enforcement agencies cannot 
simply confiscate the suspect’s computer or other digital device in order to get access to 
the digital evidence because it is uncertain where data is processed within a cloud com-
puting system, and such processing may occur in violating the privacy of other users or 
differing jurisdictions (01.Corradο Federici, 2014),  (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, 
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
3.3 Design and architectural restrictions. 
It is common knowledge that cloud services have a collection of inherited advantages 
and shortcomings depending on cloud service provider design philosophy. These design 
and architectural decisions set restrictions on what is feasible in a forensics analysis of a 
cybercrime event. Therefore, it is extremely important that the network forensics inves-
tigators comprehend various design philosophies because cloud service provider’s ar-
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chitecture will complicate the network forensics process since cloud forensics approach 
has considerably different challenges to traditional ones (04. Darren Quick, Ben 
Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), (05.Terrence V. Lillard, Clint P. Garrison, 
Craig A. Schiller, James “Jim” Steele, 2010). 
According to the traditional digital forensic method, the investigation focusses on the 
digital evidence acquisition from confiscated traditional data storage devices, such as 
Hard Disk Drives (HDDs), Solid State Drives (SSDs), Random Access Memory 
(RAM), Universal Serial Bus (USB) memory sticks and Secure Digital (SD) cards. Be-
cause of the distributed kind of data storage and processing in cloud computing, it 
would not be possible to go back to the original state of the data and some of these tra-
ditional acquisition techniques have been shown to be no longer valid, effective, or effi-
cient. As a result, a new process model suited to the cloud environment is now required 
(10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 2019), (13.Mark Taylor, John 
Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
However, in a cloud computing environment, it is frequently not feasible to access the 
physical media which stores the data of interest due to a variety of causes such as data is 
split across a huge number of cloud storage devices or to be stored overseas and out of 
the LEA jurisdiction. Additionally, cloud deployment and service models (e.g., pub-
lic/private/hybrid cloud) vary the nature and quantity of electronic evidence that can be 
collected. As an example, Software as a Service application (SaaS) registers extensively 
and especially user-initiated events along with the timestamps, making it possible to 
identify changes made by different users in a document. In the Infrastructure as a Ser-
vice (IaaS) model, snapshots capabilities of the disk and physical memory of Virtual 
Machines (VMs) are provided and the traditional forensic tools for data acquisition and 
analysis can also be reused. It is worth to be noted that it is common the collection of 
log data across all the deployment and service models (e.g. how the primary data con-
tent has been used, accessed, or altered). Obviously, such information is highly valuable 
for a forensic analyst or LEAs in order to solve cybercrime cases (03.Vassil Roussev*, 
Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016), (04. Darren 
Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
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3.4 LEA and Investigators’ challenges. 
The recognition of evidence within the cloud computing environment can be a very 
daunting and complex procedure and analysts should take into account the type of the 
cloud (private, public or a hybrid of the two) and the dissimilar computer forensic 
challenges related to the different cloud computing models, PaaS, IaaS and SaaS  
(13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
In the first place, by physically shifting the storage from the user, cloud storage 
solutions introduce numerous security and privacy issues for digital forensic 
investigators because under certain conditions, distinct files from individual customers 
may be distributed across multiple disks and storage systems across numerous 
jurisdictions. As a result, the analysis of the events sequence in a cloud computing 
system could be a difficult task since a plethora of separate machines might have been 
involved. This condition is particularly important for the preservation and collection of 
electronic evidence since it arises matters concering different country laws or service 
level agreement (SLA), between the cloud service providers (CSP) and their clients and 
it can be time consuming in investigations where the recovery of digital evidence is 
time crucial  (13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
Secondly, digital evidence is condidered to be volatile and dynamic in the Virtual 
Environments (VE) provided in a cloud computing system thus data conventionally 
written to the operating system (e.g. registry entries, temporary Internet files e.t.c.) will 
be stored within this environment and get lost or leftover artifacts could be limited, 
when the user exits the cloud. Therefore, the data must be preserved and to be ensured 
that the potential evidence is not tampered, accidentally or in perpuse. Modification of 
data could occur as it is exported from the cloud computing environment for LEA use or 
intentionally altered by the suspect. Therefore, evidence data need to be replicated to 
multiple media by the cloud providers and they should know where virtual machine 
instances are running and keep also a historical record (13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, 
David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). While cloud providers would be in a better position 
to extract relevant data from their platforms, this approach may require a great deal of 
trust to a party that does not natively offer a professional forensic services, procedures 
and advanced tools. Additionally, data should be delivered to forensic investigators in a 
well-known format, as complete as possible and with its integrity protected  
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(01.Corradο Federici, 2014), (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond 
Choo, 2014). 
Thirdly, cloud computing every so often uses new applications to provide a suitable 
environment to the users that are using a variety of devices, such as a desktop, a tablet 
or a mobile phone, as well as a wide range of applications in order to access cloud data 
or services. The absence of standardisation and cross-platform development makes it 
more challenging to develop forensic data extraction tools. Last but not least, a cloud 
computing forensic investigation may appear overwhelming due to the potential huge 
size of the system to be investigated  (13.Mark Taylor, John Haggerty, David Gresty, 
David Lamb, 2011). 
3.5 Available acquisition models and tools. 
In general, computer forensics investigations obey to a linear process consisting of iden-
tification, extraction, analysis, and presentation of evidence. First of all, the forensics 
expert identifies the possible sources of evidence and collects information about the 
suspected crime and the kind of the hardware or software that is being used by the sus-
pect. At this point, time is vital due the dynamic nature of cloud computing systems, as 
it would not be feasible to revert to the original state of the data. Secondly, the analyst 
must acquire evidence in a proper way to preserve its integrity since the computing en-
vironment is extremely volatile because it deals with virtual rather than tangible evi-
dence, such as that found in more traditional physical science-based forensics. Thirdly, 
as soon as the data has been extracted it must then be analyzed on live systems at the 
scene of the crime (incident response) or can be performed at the computer forensics 
laboratory. It must be noted that a quantity of tools and applications will be needed by 
the analyst in order to examine the evidence. Finally, the acquired evidence must be 
presented by the analyst within a judicial investigation to a court of law (13.Mark 
Taylor, John Haggerty, David Gresty, David Lamb, 2011). 
3.5.1 The client-centric acquisition model. 
Cloud computing and cloud storage services in particular, present new challenges to 
digital forensic investigations. At this time, evidence acquisition for these services fol-
lows the traditional client-centric method of collecting artifacts residing on client devic-
es where the investigator works with physical evidence carriers (e.g. storage media, 
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smartphones etc.). Sadly, in the cloud forensics case, the control over data differs in dif-
ferent service models because there are different levels of control of customers’ data 
depending on the service models (IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) with users having highest control 
in IaaS and least control in SaaS. Definitely, it is incorrect to assume that all the storage 
content associated with an account is fully replicated on the client device. There is valu-
able information collected in cloud storage accounts which is not obtainable on a PC 
which has either accessed an account or is synchronized to an account using the client 
software. This includes previous and historical versions of files and other information 
that may help in the identification of a user such as computer name and IP address used 
when making file modifications (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 
2016), (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek 
Shanmughan, 2016), (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 
2014), (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016), (09.Mahmoud M. Nasreldin, 
Magdy El-Hennawy, Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 2015). 
Cloud storage model defines how digital data is stored and retrieved across multiple dis-
tributed servers using a logical memory model in way transparent to end users. At the 
very least, cloud storage includes an amount of space for data storing and an easy inter-
face to manage files in the storage. It is worth noticing that initial cloud drive applica-
tions were mostly designed to synchronize local folders to backup copies in a cloud 
storage. Such applications often create a special folder on user’s computer for monitor-
ing purposes and the locally kept files are usually identical to those in the cloud storage. 
Furthermore, a new type of such application was lately introduced allowing user to view 
and interact with all files hosted in the cloud drive, even when they are not stored local-
ly to user’s PC by combining cloud contents into the view of the local filesystem. As 
depicted in Picture 2, this feature is already implemented by the major of Cloud services 




Picture 2: A screenshot from the OneDrive files application. 
 
At first sight, it may appear that accessing cloud Filesystem is an insignificant matter 
since cloud drives have clients that can automatically synchronize local content with the 
storage service and the credentials for the account are known. A simplistic method for 
an investigator could be just to install the client, connect to the account, and wait for the 
synchronization process to download all the data, and then can utilize the traditional fo-
rensics methods. Nevertheless, this methodology has a number of drawbacks such as the 
full synchronization could require a long time while the investigator would have no con-
trol over the acquisition order and that cloud clients are designed for two-way synchro-
nization which jeopardize the data forensic integrity (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, 
Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016). 
The fundamental weakness of client-side acquisition of cloud data is that it is basically 
an acquisition-by-proxy process. In other terms, although it looks like traditional acqui-
sition from physical media, the method does not aim at the authoritative source of the 
data, specifically the cloud service. On the contrary, it focuses on the client-side cache 
copy of cloud-hosted data as illustrated by Picture 3, a matter that has crucial conse-
quences for forensic acquisition (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 
2016), (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek 
Shanmughan, 2016). 
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Picture 3: Cloud drive service diagram. 
 
Consequently, there are several issues with the application of existing client-side meth-
ods (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 2016), (08.Gilbert Peterson, 
Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016). For instance: 
• Completeness and Partial replication. 
The dependence on client-side data can leave out critical case data as there is no guaran-
tee that any of the clients attached to an account will have a complete copy of the cloud 
drive's content. Nowadays, most of the Cloud Services Providers (e.g. Google, Amazon 
etc.) offer plenty of TB of online storage and as data continues to get gathered online, it 
rapidly becomes impractical to keep full copies on all devices. It is most likely that us-
ers would have no device with a complete copy of the data and from a forensics point of 
view, a direct access to the cloud drive's metadata to determine its contents is required 
as opposed to relying on the client cache data that would result in an essentially inade-
quate acquisition with unknown gaps. 
• Cloud-Native Artifacts. 
In the web-based applications era, the digital forensics experts have to learn how to deal 
with digital artifacts that do not have serialized image in local filesystems. For instance, 
“Google Docs” documents are kept locally as links to the documents that can only be 
edited via the proper web application. Therefore, acquiring a document link, by itself, is 
not the goal as it is the content of the document that is of principal interest. Occasional-
ly, a usable snapshot of the web application artifact could be acquired for forensics pur-
poses (e.g., in PDF format), by requesting it from the service directly. However, this 




Plenty cloud storage services offer a revision history feature with a variable lookback 
period, usually from a month to infinite time, depending on the service and subscription 
terms. Revisions exist in in the cloud and cloud clients seldom have anything other ex-
cept the most recent versions in their caches. As a result, a client-side acquisition will 
miss prior and perhaps important revisions. 
• Correctness and Reproducibility. 
In order to develop solid cloud forensics tools, the knowledge of cloud client applica-
tions’ functionality is required. However, it is unfeasible to reverse engineer all the as-
pects of a client application while missing its source code and this instantly brings into 
question the correctness of the analysis. Furthermore, such cloud storage clients are up-
dated regularly with new features and cloud forensics are obliged to keep up the reverse 
engineering works, making it tougher to maintain the reproducibility of examinations. 
• Cost & scalability. 
It is obvious that manual client-side analysis is kind of oppressive and simply does not 
scale with the rapid development of the variety of services and their versions. 
Whichever way one looks at this issue, the truth is that the client-side approach to drive 
acquisition has serious shortcomings and it is apparent that some of the traditional ap-
proaches and tools used by digital investigators may no longer be valid, effective, or 
efficient. Obviously, a different approach that can obtain data directly from the cloud 
service is required because storage, processing, and transmission of data has changed in 
the cloud in comparison to traditional environment  (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres 
Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 2016), (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016), (10.Lei 
Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 2019). 
3.5.2 The API-based acquisition model. 
In this chapter, an alternative approach for acquiring evidence from cloud storage ser-
vices is explained in detail. This approach introduces the notion of the Application Pro-
gram Interfaces (APIs) based acquisition which addresses the foremost limitations of 
traditional acquisition techniques by utilizing the officially supported APIs provided by 
the cloud services. Providentially, cloud services provide via API, a storage service that 
resembles to that of a local filesystem and the API-based acquisition approach results in 
a logical – not physical– evidence acquisition of the cloud drive content in a forensical-
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ly sound manner. There are certain aspects that need to be considered prior to designing 
strategies and tools able to image cloud data. First and most important, forensic best 
practices suggest applying a read only access to cloud storage areas similar to the tradi-
tional write blocking mechanisms in order to avoid modification of digital evidences, 
Furthermore, it is evident that cloud drive acquisition cannot be performed on a client in 
a forensically appropriate way because the client is not certain to mirror all the data and 
has no capabilities to keep file revisions and the content of cloud-native artifacts. As a 
consequence, the correct tactic is to go directly to the source – the master copy main-
tained by the cloud service and acquire the data via the API which supports the repro-
ducibility of results and the development effort is significantly lesser because the back-
box reverse engineering factor of client-centric approach is eliminated (01.Corradο 
Federici, 2014), (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016). 
An important issue is the fact that applying an API-based approach leads in logical evi-
dence acquisition, not physical. An argument is that data should be obtained at the low-
est possible level of abstraction results in the most reliable evidence and that the logical 
view of the data may not be forensically complete (e.g. data marked as deleted or hid-
den may be not shown). Although this point of view would have been reasonably justi-
fied a few years earlier, it is vital to consider new technology advancements. As an ex-
ample, solid-stated drives (SSDs) and even newer generations of high-capacity HDDs 
contain microprocessors that execute complex load-balancing and wear-leveling algo-
rithms and perform background data relocation. Although they support block-level ac-
cess, the acquisition results do not precisely map to a physical layout of the data and the 
this characterizes the acquired image logical, not physical (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres 
Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 2016), (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016). 
The API cloud service is the key to obtaining a forensically precise snapshot of the con-
tent of a cloud storage drive, and it should be implemented as a best practice. According 
to Figure 4, the client of the cloud drive manages the local cache and uses the exact 
same interface to perform its operations at the lowest available level of abstraction and 
it is the appropriate interface for performing forensic acquisition due to the fact that in 
many cases, file metadata often includes cryptographic hashes of the content, which en-
ables strong integrity guarantee (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, 





Picture 4: SaaS cloud drive service diagram. 
 
Specifically, the acquisition process consists of the three following core phases, as de-
picted in Picture 5 (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016):  
• Content discovery. 
Throughout the content discovery, the acquisition tool queries the target and obtains a 
catalog of artifacts (e.g. files) as well as their metadata. The query could be limited to 
only enumerating all the available files or under more advance situations, search func-
tionality provided by the API could be utilized (e.g., Google Drive). 
• Target selection. 
During the selection process, a prioritized catalog of targeted artifacts can be automati-
cally filtered or by user’s request and the result is a record of targets that is passed to the 
tool for acquisition. On the contrary, traditional approaches instinctively acquire all the 
obtainable data in order to filter it later but this method is not viable for cloud targets 
where the amount of data could be enormous. 
• Target acquisition. 
This is the final phase. The acquisition tool is connected to API cloud services and the 




Picture 5: Acquisition Phases. 
It is obvious that acquisition of evidence data from cloud storage providers using the 
official APIs provided by the services, has the following conceptual advantages. API 
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cloud services are officially supported by the provider and have comprehensive docu-
mentation that allows for proper and accurate approach to forensic tool development 
which is almost always easier and cheaper than backbox reverse engineering that never 
achieves the perfection. Furthermore, APIs are changing slowly, and any changes are 
clearly marked with the new features adapted incrementally in an acquisition tool. Thus, 
it is quite easy to validate completeness and reproducibility using an API specification. 
Likewise, acquisition completeness guarantee can only be accomplished via the API 
since the client cache method contains an unknown portion of the data content 
(02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 2016),  (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan 
Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016), (08.Gilbert Pe-
terson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016). 
Over the last few years, multiple tools have been released to enable API-based collec-
tion of cloud storage data. This is significant but with API-based collections, often oc-
curs the problem that they require valid user credentials and possible multi-factor au-
thentication. Furthermore, the client-side acquisition approach is still valid and useful, 
for the reason that cloud forensics data and metadata stored on the local device are of-
ten-overlooked and the latter which have synchronized to a cloud storage service may 
contain a treasure of data relevant to an investigation. Such data could be metadata on 
locally synchronized files in addition to files only stored in the cloud, deleted items that 
may still be recoverable, and other files present in cloud storage cache folders even 
when they were not designated for local synchronization. To sum up, local device may 
contain files and metadata noticeably different than the current cloud repository like the 
case of encryption technologies designed to keep data encrypted in the cloud, while the 
local archive may be the best decrypted available copy (11.Chad Tilbury, 2019). 
In conclusion, evidence acquisition is a challenging process. Digital forensics in a cloud 
environment is considered alive system which has valuable information and there is a 
chance to be partially up, in the situation of compromise. The cloud is considered com-
pletely dead when you shut down the entire cloud and this possibility is almost impossi-
ble. Thus, this gives the investigator the opportunity for more files, connections, and 
services to be acquired and investigated (09.Mahmoud M. Nasreldin, Magdy El-
Hennawy, Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 2015). 
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3.5.3 Related works and available tools. 
Generally speaking, cloud computing applications come along with an ever‐increasing 
number and scale of cyber and cloud attacks that provide possible occasions for cyber-
criminals to hack into business and personal cloud environments and obtain sensitive 
and private data. Therefore, cloud forensics has emerged as an important area of re-
search and practice and has caught the attention of digital forensic investigators which 
have presented their research findings concerning cloud acquisition and analysis such as 
methods and tools as well as the challenges, they have faced during forensic investiga-
tions in the cloud environment (10.Lei Chen, Hassan Takabi, Nhien‐An Le‐Khac, 
2019). 
Despite the existence of a small quantity of published papers in the area of cloud foren-
sics and the fact that they have provided a solid grounding for the required research, ac-
ademic publications remain to some extent obscure and in their early stages with mat-
ters that need to be addressed. There is a small number of papers examining the forensic 
collection of cloud storage on the client-side digital probably due to the complexities in 
obtaining access to a cloud providers data center in order to perform server analysis (04. 
Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). Through the last years, 
a number of forensic researchers have been experimenting on cloud drives and tech-
niques have been developed about discovering traces left on client devices by the inter-
action with cloud storage platforms. As an example, Chung et al. has developed a pro-
cedure to gather traces that could be used in criminal cases, from computer and 
smartphones accessing four cloud storage services (Amazon S3, Google Docs, Drop-
box, and Evernote). Their result pointed the fact that cloud services may create different 
artifacts depending on specific features of the services and proposed a forensic investi-
gative procedure based on the collection and analysis of artifacts of cloud storage ser-
vices recovered from client systems (01.Corradο Federici, 2014), (04. Darren Quick, 
Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), (16.Hyunji Chung, Jungheum Park, 
Sangjin Lee, Cheulhoon Kang, 2012). Furthermore, among the pioneers that first ap-
plied cloud service APIs as part of the forensic process was Huber et al. and their main 
purpose was to provide a framework for an investigation by acquiring a snapshot via the 
Facebook Graph API (08.Gilbert Peterson, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.), 2016), (17.M. Huber, 
M. Mulazzani, M. Leithner, S. Schrittwieser, G. Wondracek, E. Weippl, 2011). 
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The associated literature research demonstrated that remote data acquisition applications 
used for forensics purposes are not very widespread and instead, general-purpose foren-
sic software for the collection of cloud data stored is utilized. Specifically, tools such as 
internet browsers or client-side applications can be undoubtedly used with the expected 
results, but it is vital to underline the shortcomings like read only access or accurate 
logging compliance, as depicted in Table 1. In reality, they could not be considered as 
forensics applications since they are mostly designed to provide a convenient cloud 
read-write access to users and may be missing critical functions that need to be fulfilled 
externally by other additional software (01.Corradο Federici, 2014), (03.Vassil Rous-
sev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016). 
 
Table 1: Compliance to forensics requirements for browsers and client applications. 
 
 
In order to complete the cloud research, it is important to reference some applications 
that are designed to acquire data from cloud storages. These applications are the follow-
ing: 
• Cloud Data Imager Library (CDI Lib). 
The Cloud Data Imager Library (CDI Lib) is described as a negotiation layer that offers 
a read only access to files and metadata of selected remote folders and presently sup-
ports access to Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft Skydrive cloud storage facilities. 
It presents a unified frontend which covers up the syntactic and functional variations of 
cloud technologies via a desktop application on top of the library which, once given the 
necessary user’s credentials it claims that it delivers functionalities like folder listing of 
present, deleted or shared content, browsing revisions, extensive logging and imaging of 
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folder trees with export capabilities to an extensive range of forensic formats 
(01.Corradο Federici, 2014). 
• Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor (KAPE). 
KAPE is a free multi-function program developed in collaboration with infamous Eric 
Zimmerman and it mainly collects and processes files with one or more programs in a 
very extensible way (https://www.kroll.com). Specifically, it reads configuration files 
on the fly and based on their contents, gathers and processes relevant files supporting 
reparsing points and another symbolic redirection links with Box, Dropbox, Google 
Drive, and OneDrive cloud services. It is significant to underline that KAPE currently 
only collects cloud storage files from default locations. This means that if users have 
renamed or moved their cloud storage folder, it will be missed. For example, the 
“OneDrive” folder is expected to be at “C:\Users\<username>\OneDrive” folder loca-




Picture 6: A screenshot from the KAPE application. 
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• Elcomsoft's Cloud Data eXplorer. 
Regarding the available commercial tools, the software entitled as Elcomsoft's Cloud 
Data eXplorer provides the ability to acquire via service API user artifacts from Google 
accounts (https://www.elcomsoft.com). Such artifacts consist of users’ location history, 
emails, files and documents, Contacts, Hangouts Messages, Google Keep, Chrome 
browser history, Calendars, images, profile information, messages, contacts, and search 
history. However, this piece of software supports only Google services and the common 
license costs about 2000 €. A screenshot from Elcomsoft's Cloud Data eXplorer is por-
trayed in Picture 7 (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 2016), 




Picture 7: A screenshot from the Elcomsoft's Cloud Data eXplorer application. 
 
• Kumo Data Dumper (Kumodd). 
Kumodd is an open-source command line utility for forensic acquisition of Google 
Drive cloud storage and provides an adaptation tier between the local filesystem, and 
the cloud drive service (https://kumodd.readthedocs.io). It is capable to perform full or 
partial acquisition of a cloud storage account's data in a forensically sound way using 
MD5 verification of each acquired file including its metadata and it requires authorized 
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read-only access via public APIs. Additionally, the code is written in Python and be-
sides the command line, it also offers a web-based user interface. In Picture 8, a screen-
shot of the Kumodd is illustrated (02.Vassil Roussevy, Andres Barreto, Irfan Ahmed, 
2016), (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek 




Picture 8: A screenshot from the Kumodd application. 
 
In conclusion, it is essential to emphasize that the cloud technological achievement 
leads to a major development for forensics because many of the existing tools are prov-
en to be insufficient for the full spectrum of cloud services. It could be beneficial to 
consider that relatively minor adjustments to tools and practices are insufficient to ad-
dress current forensics issues and cloud-aware tools should be reengineered from the 
ground up (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, Shane McCulley, Vivek 
Shanmughan, 2016). 
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4 A proposed cloud storage 
acquisition method. 
It is commonly believed that cloud forensics are still in its childhood and most im-
portantly, in a phase where the overwhelming majority of the efforts are mostly concen-
trated on enumerating the problems that the cloud poses to traditional forensic ap-
proaches while seeking ways to easily adapt the existing techniques. Consequently, it is 
a major importance having a robust evidence acquisition method to gather this data 
when authorized by legal authority, as the information may assist in an investigation or 
court proceedings or for an audit (03.Vassil Roussev*, Irfan Ahmed, Andres Barreto, 
Shane McCulley, Vivek Shanmughan, 2016), (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-
Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
In order to further explore methods of acquiring and preserving cloud storage data, an 
experiment is conducted aiming to propose an adaptable and extensible tool that allows 
us to collect, organize, and preserve electronic evidence in a forensics safe way that en-
sures integrity of the acquired data. This approach utilizes API advantages to identify 
the cloud service provider and particular user account details and takes into considera-
tion client-side limitations factors such as that full synchronization and data download-
ing could take a very long time due to the potential size of the system to be investigated, 
no control over the order data is acquired, the controversial two-way synchronization 
and finally the economic cost of disclosure request and storage of the obtained evidence 
data (e.g. companies’ data request billing, purchase of HDDs etc.). 
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, and to obtain first-hand experience with 
the process, we experiment with a cloud drive acquisition method that offers the ability 
to perform a complete acquisition of three popular cloud drive's content. Particularly, 
our implementation scenario is to access and collect files from three suspicious cloud 
storage accounts with the popular service providers Google Drive, Microsoft Onedrive 
and Dropbox, assuming that legal authority exists and the legal process to preserve data 
via a service provider is considered burdensome and not timely, which in theory means 
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a user may be able to access an account and delete or alter files before information can 
be preserved.  
Specifically, the experimentation involves three phases. First of all, we create the three 
dummy suspect’s storage accounts as free users, and we upload pre-hashed files to them 
until reaching cloud’s allowed capacity (15GB for Google drive, 5GB for Onedrive and 
2GB for Dropbox). Secondly, a virtual machine (VM) running Linux is deployed for 
free on Google Cloud infrastructure and used as the Law Enforcement Agency investi-
gator’s evidence storage with the intention of avoiding downloading locally the ac-
quired data while taking advantage of providers’ high-speed connections and low-cost 
achievement (no need to purchase any HDDs). It must be noted that the adaptation layer 
between the VM’s local filesystem, and the aforementioned cloud drive services is 
achieved via the Rclone application which supports connectivity as a mount point with a 
plethora of cloud storage services. Last but not least, we use SSH connection to run 
commands on the VM and acquire all the uploaded files from the suspicious cloud stor-
ages via Rclone mount points while at the same time we perform internet connection 
speed tests. The cryptographic signatures (hashes) of the obtained files are compared to 
those of the sample ones in order to demonstrate the files integrity to reach to safe as-
sumptions and an in-depth awareness of the artifacts available to forensics researchers 
when conducting analysis on cloud storage environments. 
4.1 Cloud Storages Accounts setup. 
For the purpose of the first step of the experiment, we use three null files of specific size 
as samples (100MB.bin, 1GB.bin and 10GB.bin). To calculate their cryptographic hash 
values as a reference point, we utilize the HashMyFiles (v2.36 for windows) application, 
created by Nir Sofer (http://www.nirsoft.net) and the results are depicted in Picture 9. 
 
Picture 9: A screenshot from the HashMyFiles application. 
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Next action is to examine three popular public cloud storage providers, namely Google 
Drive, Microsoft OneDrive and Dropbox by creating dummy storage accounts and up-
loading multiple copies of the aforesaid files, up to the maximum storage limit, with the 
intention of simulating a number of files that people usually keep in cloud facilities. 
4.1.1 Google Drive. 
Google Drive is a service provided by Google Inc. and users have 15 GB of data storage 
when creating a free account but additional storage, ranging from 100 GB to 16 TB, is 
available as a paid service (https://www.google.com/intl/en/drive/). Google Drive can 
be accessed via a web browser or else client software available for windows computers 
or portable devices (Android, Apple iOS or Windows OS are supported).  
Legally, Google, Inc. is an U.S. based enterprise, but it also has offices throughout the 
world (e.g. Google Ireland Ltd is in charge for the European region). According to 
Google’ s legal process, user’s information disclosure is possible for government agen-
cies and courts, depending whether the request is applied from authorities within the 
United States or not. For a government agency within the U.S., a legal process such as a 
subpoena, court order, or search warrant is required to obtain user information from 
Google, otherwise for foreign agencies outside of the country, the use of an Mutual Le-
gal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) is required. Despite the fact that the subject of this thesis 
is not orientated to the legal matters of cloud computing, it is beneficial to mention that 
an MLAT is an agreement between almost sixty treaty countries (Greece included) that 
enables the bilateral exchange of information and evidence, in an attempt to enforce 
public or criminal laws. Unfortunately, this procedure involves diplomatic channels of 
communication in a complicated and heavily delayed manner due to law differences as 
may apply in different countries and jurisdictions (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-
Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
Finally, the steps to create the first suspect’s storage account on Google Drive, are the 
following: 
• We visit the Google Drive website at https://drive.google.com/drive/my-drive and 
we choose the Personal option (Picture 10).  
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Picture 10: A screenshot from the Google Drive website. 
 
• We create a dummy Google Account using the demosuspect@gmail.com email ac-
count (Picture 11). 
 
Picture 11: A screenshot while creating the Google account. 
 
• Then, follows the verification of the account via an SMS message sent to a mobile 
telephone number (Picture 12 and 13). 
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Picture 12: A screenshot while asking for telephone verification. 
 
Picture 13: A screenshot while verifying the telephone number. 
 
• In order to continue, we accept Google’s Privacy and Terms (Picture 14). 
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Picture 14: A screenshot while creating the Google account. 
 
• When the new Google Drive account is ready, we upload the sample files to reach 
the limit storage of 15GB (Picture 15). 
 
 
Picture 15: A screenshot while uploading the sample files. 
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• Finally, all files are uploaded, and the account is out of storage (Picture 16). 
 
 
Picture 16: A screenshot of the Google Drive with all uploads finished. 
4.1.2 Microsoft Onedrive. 
Microsoft Onedrive (formerly known as Microsoft SkyDrive, Windows Live Folders 
and Windows Live SkyDrive) is a service offered by Microsoft Inc. to users who come 
up with 5GB of free storage but for additional space, varying from 100 GB to 6 TB, a 
subscription is required (https://onedrive.com). Microsoft Onedrive can be accessed us-
ing a web browser or client software and the latter is available for computers or portable 
devices (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
Referring to the legal matters, Microsoft is located in the U.S., but it also has contact 
points for law enforcement and legal authorities in various countries, including Greece. 
Microsoft states in its terms of service that it follows a policy for legal requests from 
law enforcement, quite similar as the one already mentioned for Google Drive in chap-
ter 5.1.1. 
Below are described the steps required to create the second suspect’s storage account on 
Microsoft Onedrive: 




Picture 17: A screenshot from the Microsoft Onedrive website. 
 
• We create a dummy Onedrive Account using the demosuspect@outlook.com email 
account (Picture 18). 
 
Picture 18: A screenshot while creating the Microsoft account. 
• We create a password for the Microsoft account (Picture 19). 
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Picture 19: A screenshot while setting a password for the Microsoft account. 
• The next requirement is to setup the user’s name, e.g. John Doe (Picture 20). 
 
Picture 20: A screenshot while setting the user’s name for the Microsoft account. 
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• Then, Microsoft requires us to solve a CAPCHA to prove that we are humans (Pic-
ture 21). 
 
Picture 21: A screenshot while solving the required CAPCHA question. 
• When the new Microsoft Onedrive account is ready, we upload the sample files to 
reach the limit storage of 5GB (Picture 22). 
 
Picture 22: A screenshot while uploading the sample files to Onedrive. 
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4.1.3 Dropbox. 
Dropbox is a cloud file storage service allowing users to store 2 GB of data (files and 
folders) for free but further storage space can be obtained by referring or signing up new 
users or buying larger storage sizes, rating from 100 GB to as much as necessary 
(https://www.dropbox.com/). Dropbox is accessible from a web browser or client soft-
ware and the latter is available for computers e.g. Windows, Apple Mac, Linux OS and 
portable devices e.g. Apple iOS, Android, Blackberry, and Windows Phone OS (04. 
Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
Legally speaking, Dropbox Inc. is also a U.S. company and according to its user agree-
ment, it must comply with the domestic law provisions related to data involved to an 
investigation. Specifically, the Dropbox privacy policy states that the company cooper-
ates with U.S. authorities when a valid legal process is received or with foreign Law 
enforcement agencies via a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process and they 
will also remove their encryption when disclosing files. 
It is following all the prerequisite steps to build the third and last suspect’s storage ac-
count on Dropbox: 
• We visit the Dropbox website at https://dropbox.com (Picture 23). 
 
Picture 23: A screenshot from the Dropbox website. 
• We create a dummy Onedrive Account using the demosuspect@gmail.com email 
account (Picture 24). 
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Picture 24: A screenshot while creating the Dropbox account. 
• Now, we can see the user panel of the new Dropbox account (Picture 25). 
 
Picture 25: A screenshot from the just created Dropbox account. 
• Once the new Dropbox account is ready, we upload the sample files to reach the 
limit storage of 2GB (Picture 26). 
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Picture 26: A screenshot while uploading the sample files to Dropbox. 
4.2 Google Cloud Platform (GCP). 
The second phase of our experiment explores the process of deploying a virtual machine 
(VM) on the Google Cloud Platform (GCP) that it is going to be later used as our cloud 
evidence storage. There are considerable benefits of this approach. First of all, saving 
critical time by utilizing the cloud provider’s network throughput when potentially a 
malicious user may be able to access an account and delete or alter files before the ac-
quisition procedure is completed. Secondly, the investigator has to spend less time on 
the investigation location and less personnel are occupied because data is not locally 
downloaded after a significant amount of time, due to slow domestic internet connection 
speeds (e.g. LEA officers or Judicial Authorities representatives have to remain less 
time present during an under a warrant search in a suspect’s residence or office). Final-
ly, the economic cost is reduced because there is no need for the investigator to pur-
chase and carry along extra HDDs in case of high-volume evidence seizure. 
For the implementation of the investigator’s cloud storage instance, we use Google 
Cloud Platform (GCP) which is a suite of cloud computing services offered by Google 
that runs on the same infrastructure that Google uses internally for its end-user products 
(e.g. Google Search, Gmail, YouTube etc.). Also, management tools are provided in 
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conjunction with a variety of cloud services such as computing and data storage plus 
user registration requires a credit card or bank account details. Thanks to Google Cloud 
Free Program, every user who is looking to learn the basics of the Google Cloud can 
take advantage of a 90-day trial period that includes $300 in free Cloud Billing credits 
that can be used toward one or a combination of products. This is a great opportunity to 
obtain a cloud storage for free and use it for the purposes of this dissertation research 
(https://cloud.google.com/free/docs/gcp-free-tier). 
Once the deployment of our data storage VM is accomplished, we setup the adaptation 
layer provided by Rclone between the VM’s local filesystem, and the suspect’s cloud 
storages whose files we plan to acquire in compliance with concepts and procedures set 
forth by relevant regulations and best forensics practices. The requirements that should 
be hopefully fulfilled by our cloud storage forensic strategy, are described below 
(01.Corradο Federici, 2014): 
• Logical acquisition. 
The retrieval of file content and metadata should be regardless of cloud platform filesys-
tem technology and in a complete manner via the provided programming interface 
(API). Additionally, confidentiality of communications is guaranteed using the Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. 
• Required functions. 
A minimum package of functions should be implemented allowing tasks such as re-
trieval of user information (name, ID etc.), user authentication and authorization, expo-
sure of folders with its existing subfolders and files including their metadata (at least 
name, size, creation and modification date) and recovery of. deleted items or shared 
content with other users, if possible. 
• Low level access & Officially supported interface. 
To achieve completeness, extra care should be taken in order to decide on the API de-
tails that allows to acquire the maximum quantity possible of information. Access 
should occur to the lowest possible level despite the greater degree of development 
work because it allows enhanced control over data retrieval. Moreover, only officially 
supported API and not function calls which were developed by reverse engineering of 
code or via protocol inspectors, should be applied. 
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• Read only access. 
The principle of reliability of digital evidence orders that cloud stored content and its 
metadata should be safe against any accidental tamper. Hence, we are obliged to access 
remote content of the targeted storages in a read-only mode, utilizing a write protection 
mechanism to avoid the possibility of undermining an acquisition. This safe condition is 
not always achieved using internet browsers or client applications because they could 
possibly cause accidental alterations to storage area data and. As a precaution, perhaps 
the provider could also release a new account to Law Enforcement Agency’s investiga-
tor with exclusive access to suspect’s storage area and relevant write permissions could 
be removed. 
• On demand folder browsing and folder imaging. 
According to the principle of sufficiency of digital evidence, the on-demand function to 
browse a suspect’s account is vital in order to exclude from imaging, any apparent irrel-
evant folders. By excluding a blind acquisition of the evidence data, unnecessary net-
work traffic is prevented and most importantly, triaging data is better supported in case 
of very large data that cannot be entirely acquired in the permitted time period. Specifi-
cally, once the relevant folder is recognized and chosen, our implementation traverses 
its complete tree to acquire remote data contained into logical evidence files. After-
wards, we assure the integrity protection by computing hash values of the obtained files 
so as to avert the possibility that the evidence is tampered with after it has been ac-
quired. 
• Native logging. 
All the performed actions should be documented and available for an independent as-
sessor to evaluate them as stated in Clause 5.3.2 of ISO/IEC 27037. Therefore, a log-
ging facility that creates an audit trail for all actions and the occurred events, must be 
available. 
4.2.1 Setup of the Storage VM on GCP. 
It is evident that the cloud computing model could also be very helpful for forensics by 
allowing storage of very large log entries or evidence files on a storage instance or in a 
very large database for later data retrieval and discovery (05.Terrence V. Lillard, Clint 
P. Garrison, Craig A. Schiller, James “Jim” Steele, 2010). 
All the necessary actions to establish a working storage VM, are described as follows: 
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• We visit the GCP console at https://console.cloud.google.com and we login using a 
valid google account in order to create our project (Picture 27). 
 
Picture 27: A screenshot from Google Cloud Platform (CGP) console. 
• We create a new VM instance via the Compute Engine. There is an option to con-
figure the exact hardware (processor type, CPU cores and threads, RAM and 
HDD/SDD amount etc.) and choose from a variety of operating systems (Windows 
and Linux distros) for our VM.  Each VM instance costs us money that is monthly 
charged to our credit account (currently, our credit is $300 for a 90 days trial peri-
od). For the purposes of this dissertation, we choose to setup a headless Ubuntu 
16.05 system, composed of 1 Intel Haswell vCPU, 2 GB memory and 20 GB SSD 
drive (Pictures 28 και 29). 
 
Picture 28: A screenshot while creating the storage VM instance. 
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Picture 29: A screenshot from Google Cloud Platform (CGP) console. 
• Since our VM instance is headless (no desktop is installed), we have to operate it via 
the SSH protocol. Although, Google provides built-in SSH clients, we prefer to use 
the notorious Putty client by Simon Tatham (https://www.putty.org/). However, the 
proper SSH key pair is required and we generate the private and public key pair us-
ing the puTTYgen application (https://www.puttygen.com/), as illustrated in Picture 
30. 
 
Picture 30: A screenshot while creating a public/private SSH key pair. 
• Next step is to upload the created SSH key pair to our VM instance via the Google 
Cloud Platform console (Picture 31). 
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Picture 31: A screenshot while uploading the SSH key to Console. 
• Before proceeding further to our experiment, we test that we can successfully con-
nect to the VM instance via the SSH client. Therefore, we open the settings options 
of the Putty application, we include the SSH pair key and we connect to the VM at 
its current external IP address (e.g. 32.225.25.196), as user LEA (Picture 32). 
 
Picture 32: A screenshot while connecting to VM instance using SSH. 
• As depicted in Picture 33, we are now successfully connected to the VM instance. 
For compatibility and security reasons, we update the Ubuntu operating system, us-
ing the command: 
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~$ sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade 
 
Picture 33: A screenshot while updating the VM instance. 
• We can check VM instance’ s system information using the command: 
~$ sudo uname -a | sudo lshw | sudo lscpu (as in Picture 34). 
 
Picture 34: A screenshot illustrating VM’s system information. 
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• Since we are interested in using the VM instance as the investigator’s storage facili-
ty, the network speed is highly important. To estimate performance, we install and 
execute an application to measure the network speed using the commands: 
~$ sudo apt install speedtest-cli 
~$ sudo speedtest-cli 
As we observe, the download speed is valued at about 773 Mbit per second for this 
free of charge VM instance (Picture 35). 
 
Picture 35: A screenshot illustrating VM’s system information. 
• Another option to login to our VM instance instead of using the SSH pair keys, is to 
enable the user authentication and create a new Linux user. To allow user authenti-
cation, firstly we have to edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file using the following com-
mands and set PasswordAuthentication parameter from no to yes, then save and exit 
(Pictures 36 and 37). 
~$ sudo su 
~$ nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config 
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Picture 36: A screenshot of the sshd_config file. 
 
Picture 37: A screenshot while enabling the PasswordAuthentication option. 
Secondly, we have to restart the SSH service using the command: service sshd re-
start (Picture 38) and finally to create a new super user e.g. LEAuser (Picture 38), 
applying the following commands: 
~$ adduser LEAuser 
~$ usermod -aG sudo LEAuser 
~$ sudo whoami 
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Picture 38: A screenshot while creating the LEAuser super user. 
• Now that we have the new super user ready, we are able to quit the Putty SSH ses-
sion and reconnect using the LEAuser credentials, as it is depicted in Picture 39.  
 
Picture 39: A screenshot from the successful SSH login as the LEAuser user. 
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• We must underline the fact that Google changes VM instance’s external IP periodi-
cally or upon every start/stop/reboot unless we pay for a static IP. Since we are de-
cided to experiment at no cost and at the same moment, we need to contact conven-
iently our VM, we can obtain a domain name and a Dynamic Domain Name Service 
(DDNS) for gratis. Therefore, we create an account at DNSExit website 
(http://www.dnsexit.com/) and register the domain name lea.linkpc.net (Picture 40). 
The latter is set to point toward our VM’s current IP address as illustrated in Picture 
41. Now, we can use the domain name lea.linkpc.net with Putty, instead of VM’s IP 
address, in order to connect via the SSH protocol. 
 
Picture 40: A screenshot while registering the free domain name. 
  
Picture 41: A screenshot while setting the name servers for the free domain name. 
• It is worth noticing that the DDNS service should be regularly updated with new IP 
address that is frequently assigned to our VM by Google. The solution to this issue 
could be to install a DDNS client on the VM that communicates with and updates 
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the DDNS service every time the dynamic IP changes. However, this is achieved 
easier via this curl command (please note that username & password are truncated): 
https://update.dnsexit.com/RemoteUpdate.sv?login=*&password=*&host=lea.link
pc.net 
Overall, we need to setup a cron job in the VM’s crontab file that is repeated every 
five minutes as portrayed in Picture 42, using the following commands: 
~$ crontab -e 
~$ crontab -l  
 
Picture 42: A screenshot while adding the periodic DDNS curl command. 
4.2.2 Installation of Rclone application. 
The element which is responsible for the heavy lifting of communicating with the sus-
pect’s cloud storage account is the magnificent Rclone tool by Nick Craig-Wood 
(https://rclone.org/). This exceptional piece of software is an open source command line 
program widely used on Linux, Windows, or Mac and capable to manage files on over 
forty (40) cloud storage products. 
Rich of features, the Rclone software can mount multiple cloud storage as a read-only 
disk on the VM system providing operations such as backup, restore, mirror, or migrate 
data from/to cloud storages. Data transfers include the following features: 
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•  Read-only mount capability, similar to write blocker devices. 
• Checksum verification through MD5 and SHA1 hashes that are checked at all times 
for file integrity. 
• File timestamps and metadata preservation. 
• Transfer operations can be resumed at any time. 
• Use of multithreaded downloads. 
• Employment of server-side transfers to minimize local bandwidth use and support of 
transfers from one cloud provider to another, without local disk usage 
• Tons of commands to perform all necessary file actions. 
The procedure to install the Rclone application on the VM instance, is quite straight-
forward using the command: 
~$ sudo curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash  
as illustrated in Picture 43 and its settings file is found in the user configuration folder: 
"/home/LEAuser/.config/rclone/rclone.conf". 
 
Picture 43: A screenshot while installing the Rclone application. 
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4.3 Cloud connections, Acquisition and Data trans-
fer speeds. 
This is the final stage and in accordance with the objectives of our experiment, the stor-
age VM instance is now properly setup and running on the Google cloud infrastructure, 
as well as the suspicious cloud storage accounts currently store the sample data evi-
dence. The sample data size is 15GB for Google Drive, 5GB for Microsoft Onedrive 
and 2GB for Dropbox, split into several files (10GB, 1GB or 100MB each). In order to 
perform a basic validation of our implementation, we run the suitable commands on the 
VM via an SSH connection and our purpose is in all cases, to successfully obtain every 
file from all the aforementioned cloud storages and at the same time, to get a sense of 
the acquisition speed rates.  
Prior to describe the acquisition process, it is worth commenting the following issues: 
• Intending to eliminate any potential constraints spanning from our ISP, LAN, or 
the involved cloud storage Providers, the acquisition process was repeated at dif-
ferent times of day over a period of one week and the measured average down-
load and throughput times did not witness any constant diversions. Perhaps, a 
paid subscription to Google for a dedicated cloud VM instance could lead to bet-
ter data transfer speeds. 
• During the cloud accounts connection process, we assume that these technical 
activities are performed when allowed by the legislation and with the consent of 
the suspect who willingly gives his/her credentials because the latter is interested 
in a trusted snapshot of his/her cloud stored data without any alterations. In the 
opposite scenario, the suspect is not cooperative and Law Enforcement Agencies 
may possibly perform a forensic analysis of any user seized devices, such as 
computer hard drives, network traffic, or mobile devices, in order to recover 
username and passwords of a storage account or even an access token string 
(AT) capable to bypass user authentication (01.Corradο Federici, 2014), (04. 
Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
• Similarly, to guard and preserve the integrity of electronic evidence and to be 
able to prove in a court or audit situation that it is the identical evidence as was 
requested or was created originally, we created a hash value of that evidence be-
fore it is uploaded to the storage accounts and once, we acquire it from them. 
During the hash algorithm process we do not manipulate or write any data to the 
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cloud accounts we are copying from, and we carefully document those hash val-
ues in a text file that we save with the copied data in order to verify the evidence 
integrity (06.David R. Matthews, 2016), (09.Mahmoud M. Nasreldin, Magdy El-
Hennawy, Heba K. Aslan, Adel El-Hennawy, 2015). 
4.3.1 Google Drive acquisition. 
In order to setup the Rclone link with the suspect’s google drive, we send the following 
command to the VM instance via the SSH connection, as depicted in Picture 43: 
~$ sudo rclone config 
Once the Rclone configuration menu is open, we proceed to the following actions: 
- We choose "n" to add a new remote mount connection. 
- We can type "googledrive" as the name of the new remote connection. 
- We select option "13" for a Google Drive type storage (Picture 44) 
 
Picture 44: A screenshot from the rclone setup, choosing the Google Drive storage. 
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- We can use Google’s default client ID and secret token, however we use our own for 
better data transfer performance (Picture 45). 
- We select option "2" to secure a read-only access with the rclone connection. 
- We can keep the defaults for the rest of the options till "Use auto config" choice (pre-
vious settings are used for optimization purposes only). 
- We choose option "n" for auto config since we are working on a remote or headless 
machine. 
- We copy the produced link to the clipboard, and we will later paste here the verifica-
tion code issued by Google. 
 
Picture 45: A screenshot from the Rclone showing the Client Id and token. 
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At this moment, we have to use our browser and perform the following actions: 
- We paste the rclone produced link to the address bar and we visit it. 
- A warning that the rclone application is not verified by Google, is raised. We choose 
the "show advanced" option, and we click on the "Go to Rclone (unsafe)" link (Picture 
46). 
- A new warning for granting Grant Rclone permission is shown and we choose "Al-
low" (Picture 47). 
 
Picture 46: A screenshot from a Google warning that Rclone is unverified. 
 
Picture 47: A screenshot from a Google warning about granting permission to 
Rclone. 
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- We confirm our choice to trust Rclone by choosing "Allow" to the next Google warn-
ing (Picture 48). 
- A code is generated by Google and we have to copy it to the clipboard in order to ap-
ply it with the Rclone setup (Picture 49). 
 
Picture 48: A screenshot from a Google warning about confirming trust to Rclone. 
 
Picture 49: A screenshot from the Google issued code for the Rclone setup. 
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Now, we switch back to the Putty and Rclone, in order to complete the Google Drive 
storage setup. To continue the procedure, we have to perform the following actions: 
- We accept the default options till the question if the summary report is OK, and we 
choose the "y" choice. Then Rclone lists all the current remotes including “google-
drive”, success! (Picture 50). 
- Finally, we decide if we want to add another remote or to exit. We choose "q" to quit.  
 
 
Picture 50: A screenshot from the Rclone when the Google storage connection is 
ready. 
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It is important to keep in mind that after the successful remote connection with sus-
pect’s Google Drive storage, a warning email is sent to the «demosuspect@gmail.com» 
email account (Picture 51). 
 
Picture 51: A screenshot from the Gmail warning message. 
Checking the Gmail account activity, it is obvious that Rclone has now access to this 
particular Google Drive and a final warning is displayed, checking if the owner is aware 
of this fact. We choose the option “Yes, it was me” to confirm the access to Google 
Drive, as portrayed in Picture 52. 
 
Picture 52: A screenshot from the final Gmail warning message. 
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We are ready to acquire data from the “googledrive” remote storage by sending the fol-
lowing commands to VM instance via the Putty application. 
- We check the available remote storages: 
~$ sudo rclone listremotes 
- We list the files in “googledrive” remote storage (Picture 53): 
~$ sudo rclone lsf googledrive: -R 
 
Picture 53: A screenshot showing files in Google Drive remote storage. 
- We create an evidence folder in our VM instance in order to store the acquired files 
(Picture 54). 
~$ mkdir ev_googledrive 
 
Picture 54: A screenshot creating the Evidence folder on VM instance. 
- We acquire the remote files from suspect’s Google Drive and store them into VM’ s 
local folder. It must be remarked that only new and different files are copied (source 
and target duplicates are skipped after an MD5 check). It took only 13m40sec to 
copy 13GB of data from remote to VM rather than 1h40m with an average 17Mbps 
connection in Greece (Picture 55). 
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~$ sudo rclone copy googledrive: ev_googledrive --no-traverse --progress --create-
empty-src-dirs 
 
Picture 55: A screenshot of the Google Drive acquisition process. 
- We check the acquired files to ensure that their original hash algorithms or 
timestamps are not tampered, and the result is sent to a .txt file for logging purposes. 
The hash procedure lasted about 9m to check 13GB and proved that the acquired da-
ta is forensically safe (Picture 56). 
~$ sudo rclone check ev_googledrive googledrive: --one-way > 
hash_googledrive.txt 
~$ ls -nas ev_googledrive 
 
Picture 56: A screenshot of the hash compare process. 
4.3.2 Microsoft Onedrive acquisition. 
So that we can establish the rclone link with the suspect’s Microsoft Onedrive, we send 
the following command to the VM instance via the SSH connection, as depicted in Pic-
ture 57: 
~$ sudo rclone config 
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Picture 57: A screenshot from the rclone setup, creating a new remote connection. 
Once the rclone configuration menu is open, we proceed to the following actions: 
- We choose "n" to add a new remote mount connection. 
- We can type "onedrive" as the name of the new remote connection. 
- We select option "23" for an Onedrive type storage (Picture 58) 
 
 
Picture 58: A screenshot from the Rclone setup, choosing the Microsoft Onedrive 
storage. 
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- We can keep the defaults for the rest of the options till "Use auto config" choice (pre-
vious settings are used for optimization purposes only). 
- We choose option "n" for auto config since we are working on a remote or headless 
machine. 
 
To further continue, we need another computer (e.g. the investigator’s pc) with the same 
Rclone version and a browser available in order to obtain the Onedrive authorization 
pass from Microsoft. (Picture 59). 
 
 
Picture 59: A screenshot from the Rclone setup, waiting for the Microsoft Onedrive 
approval. 
Therefore, we perform the following steps on a Windows PC: 
- We visit "https://rclone.org/downloads/" to download a version of Rclone (Picture 
60). 
 
Picture 60: A screenshot from the Rclone website. 
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- We open a command line instance (CMD) and we move to the folder where the 
Rclone zip file is extracted (Picture 61). 
 
 
Picture 61: A screenshot from the Windows command line. 
 
- We execute the command: rclone authorize "onedrive" and the default browser opens 
to Microsoft’s login webpage at “https://login.microsoftonline.com” address where we 
have to sign in using the “demosuspect@outlook.com” email account (Picture 62). 
 
 
Picture 62: A screenshot from Microsoft’s sign in webpage. 
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- It is required to provide the correct password to continue (Picture 63). 
 
 
Picture 63: A screenshot from Microsoft’s enter password webpage. 
- A warning for the 2-step verification feature is prompted and we choose the "Skip for 
now" option (Picture 64). 
 
 
Picture 64: A screenshot from Microsoft’s 2-step verification feature. 
- A warning aiming to confirm trust to Rclone is displayed, we choose the "Yes" button 
to continue (Picture 65). 
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Picture 65: A screenshot from Microsoft’s verification warning. 
 
Once the verification is true, the Rclone connection is permitted and a success notifica-
tion follows, as depicted in Picture 66. 
 
 
Picture 66: A screenshot from Microsoft’s success notification. 
It is vital to consider that after the successful remote connection with suspect’s 
Onedrive storage, a warning email is sent to the «demosuspect@outlook.com» email 
account (Picture 67) and it is apparent that Rclone is known to be granted with access to 
Onedrive storage, as displayed in Microsoft’s account activity report (Picture 68). 
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Picture 67: A screenshot from the demosuspect@outlook.com email account. 
 
Picture 68: A screenshot from Microsoft’s activity panel. 
Shifting to the CMD window, we notice that an access token is created and at this point, 
we are ready to copy it to the clipboard (Picture 69). 
 
Picture 69: A screenshot from Microsoft’s access token. 
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We switch over to Putty and operate the VM instance by following this procedure: 
- Access token is pasted to Rclone config to continue the Onedrive setup process (Pic-
ture 70). 
- Choose option "1" to select "OneDrive personal or business". 
- Choose option "0" to select the found "personal" drive. 
- At the question if the summary report is OK, choose "y". 
 
 
Picture 70: A screenshot from Rclone after pasting Microsoft’s access token. 
- Rclone lists all the current remotes including “onedrive”, success! Finally, we decide 
if we want to add another remote or to exit. We choose "q" to quit (Picture 71). 
 
 
Picture 71: A screenshot from the Rclone when the Onedrive storage connection is 
ready. 
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We are prepared to acquire data from the “onedrive” remote storage by sending the fol-
lowing commands to VM instance, via the Putty application. 
- We check the available remote storages: 
~$ sudo rclone listremotes 
- We list the files in “onedrive” remote storage (Picture 72): 
~$ sudo rclone lsf onedrive: -R 
 
Picture 72: A screenshot showing files in Onedrive remote storage. 
- We create an evidence folder in our VM instance in order to store the acquired files 
(Picture 73). 
~$ mkdir ev_onedrive 
- We acquire the remote files from suspect’s Onedrive and store them into VM’ s lo-
cal folder. It must be remarked that only new and different files are copied (source 
and target duplicates are skipped after an MD5 check). It took only 3m12sec to copy 
5GB of data from remote to VM rather than 42m with an average 17Mbps connec-
tion in Greece (Picture 73). 
~$ sudo rclone copy onedrive: ev_onedrive --no-traverse --progress --create-empty-
src-dirs 
- We check the acquired files to ensure that their original hash algorithms or 
timestamps are not tampered, and the result is sent to a .txt file for logging purposes. 
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The hash procedure lasted about 3m12sec to check 5GB and proved that the ac-
quired data is forensically accepted (Picture 73). 
~$ sudo rclone check ev_onedrive onedrive: --one-way > hash_onedrive.txt 
~$ ls -nas ev_onedrive 
 
Picture 73: A screenshot creating the Evidence folder on VM instance. 
4.3.3 Dropbox acquisition. 
In order to configure the rclone link with the suspect’s dropbox drive, we send the fol-
lowing command to the VM instance via the SSH connection, as depicted in Picture 74: 
~$ sudo rclone config 
 
Picture 74: A screenshot from the rclone setup, choosing the Dropbox storage. 
 
Once the Rclone configuration menu is open, we proceed to the following actions: 
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- We choose "n" to add a new remote mount connection. 
- We can type "dropbox" as the name of the new remote connection. 
- We select option "9" for a Dropbox type storage. 
- We can keep the defaults for the rest of the options till "Use auto config" choice (pre-
vious settings are used for optimization purposes only). 
- We choose option "n" for auto config since we are working on a remote or headless 
machine. 
 
To proceed further, we need another computer (e.g. the investigator’s pc) with the same 
Rclone version and a browser available in order to obtain the Onedrive authorization 
code from Dropbox. (Picture 75). 
 
 
Picture 75: A screenshot from the Rclone setup, waiting for the Dropbox approval. 
Therefore, we perform the following steps on a Windows PC but we can omit this step 
if we have already installed Rclone to our machine (e.g. when creating the Microsoft 
Onedrive storage connection in chapter 5.3.2): 
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Picture 76: A screenshot from the Rclone website. 
 
- We open a command line instance (CMD) and we move to the folder where the 
Rclone zip file is extracted (Picture 77). 
 
 
Picture 77: A screenshot from the Windows command line. 
 
- We execute the command: rclone autorize "dropbox" and the default browser opens to 
Dropbox login webpage at “https:// www.dropbox.com” address where we have to sign 





Picture 78: A screenshot from Dropbox sign in webpage. 
 




Picture 79: A screenshot from Dropbox verification feature. 
 
Once the verification is true, the Rclone connection is permitted and a success notifica-
tion follows, as depicted in Picture 80. 
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Picture 80: A screenshot from Microsoft’s success notification. 
It is significant to mention that after the successful remote connection with suspect’s 
Dropbox storage, a warning email is sent to the «demosuspect@gmail.com» email ac-
count (Picture 81) and it is obvious that Rclone is granted with access to Dropbox stor-
age, as displayed in the latter’s security panel (Picture 82). 
 
Picture 81: A screenshot from the demosuspect@gmail.com email account. 
 
Picture 82: A screenshot from Dropbox security panel. 
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Returning to the CMD window, we observe that an access token is created and at this 
point, we are ready to copy it to the clipboard (Picture 83). 
 
Picture 83: A screenshot from Dropbox access token. 
We switch over to Putty and operate the VM instance by following this procedure: 
- Access token is pasted to Rclone config to continue the Dropbox setup process (Pic-
ture 84). 
- At the question if the summary report is OK, choose "y". 
- Rclone lists all the current remotes including “dropbox”, success! Finally, we decide if 
we want to add another remote or to exit. We choose "q" to quit. 
 
 
Picture 84: A screenshot from Rclone after pasting Dropbox access token. 
  -83- 
We are ready to acquire data from the “dropbox” remote storage by sending the follow-
ing commands to VM instance, via the Putty application. 
- We check the available remote storages: 
~$ sudo rclone listremotes 
- We list the files in “dropbox” remote storage (Picture 85): 
~$ sudo rclone lsf dropbox: -R 
 
Picture 85: A screenshot showing files in Dropbox remote storage. 
- We create an evidence folder in our VM instance in order to store the acquired files 
(Picture 86). 
~$ mkdir ev_dropbox 
- We acquire the remote files from suspect’s Dropbox and store them into VM’ s lo-
cal folder. It must be remarked that only new and different files are copied (source 
and target duplicates are skipped after an MD5 check). It took only 47sec to copy 
2GB of data from remote to VM rather than 16m with an average 17Mbps connec-
tion in Greece (Picture 86). 




Picture 86: A screenshot creating the Evidence folder on VM instance. 
- We check the acquired files to ensure that their original hash algorithms or 
timestamps are not tampered, and the result is sent to a .txt file for logging purposes 
(Picture 87). 
~$ sudo rclone check ev_dropbox dropbox: --one-way > hash_ dropbox.txt 
~$ ls -nas ev_dropbox 
 
Picture 87: A screenshot creating the Evidence folder on VM instance. 
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4.3.4 Research findings. 
Without question, cloud storage can be and already has been used for unlawful purpos-
es. As an example, a perpetrator owns a number of cloud storage accounts with various 
providers and these accounts contain child pornography. Moreover, confiscated com-
puters which he possessed were found to have child pornography on them as well. In 
this particular example, it is an important aspect of an investigation or in a Court of Law 
procedure, to determine the amount of the child pornography material and to precisely 
compare the contents of all seized files while understanding whether cloud storage al-
ters the contents of any uploaded information (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, Kim-
Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014). 
In our research, we found that downloading from cloud does not affect the contents of 
the files, as the MD5 and SHA1 algorithmic hash values of the files downloaded were 
identical to the files in the suspect’s accounts. This reveals that no changes were made 
to the cloud data during the process of uploading, storing, and downloading. Despite 
the fact that the content of the files was not altered during this research, it is possible 
due to the nature of cloud storage, files to be modified while stored in the account by 
the owner and by others individuals when shared. Cloud providers allow for collabora-
tion in relation to documents and other files, which could cause differences between an 
original file, when it was uploaded to an account, and the subsequent file downloaded 
from the cloud storage account. 
Analysis of the obtained data from the suspect’s cloud storage accounts revealed 
changes concerning the timestamps associated with the files depending on which cloud 
service was used. In Particular, as the files were transferred from accounts storage loca-
tion to our VM storage, the timestamp information may change but the contents remain 
intact, as exhibited by the examined hash values. As already mentioned, this is an im-
portant aspect of an investigation because it is absolutely necessary to understand how 
different circumstances may affect file timestamps depending on the method of access 
and download, in order to make available precise findings in relation to events and pro-
vide accurate information to investigators or the Court. 
For example, a conclusion reached relying only on a timestamp value may result in a 
false assumption which creates implications in an investigation and legal proceedings, 
as it could provide an alibi for a perpetrator or worse, to indicate a person not responsi-
ble for the creation, modification, or access to a file. Because timestamps are easily al-
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tered, differences in comparison with the original file should be considered when form-
ing a conclusion with regard to the relevance of a timestamp. The actual times in rela-
tion to an event could be different to what is assumed if all circumstances are not con-
sidered, such as altered timestamps from cloud storage downloads or implications when 
conducting analysis on hard drives when a user has synchronized or downloaded files 
from an account prior to seizure. 
According our experiment, we have reached to the result that although the content of the 
downloaded files remains intact, changes occur to their timestamp information as de-
picted in Pictures 88 through 90. 
 
Picture 88: A screenshot of downloaded files timestamps (Google Drive). 
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Picture 89: A screenshot of downloaded files timestamps (Microsoft Onedrive). 
 
Picture 90: A screenshot of downloaded files timestamps (Dropbox). 
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To sum up our findings, all timestamp changes to the downloaded files are outlined in 
Table 2. It must be noted that some downloaded files reported the upload time as the 
last accessed time while others contained the download time. 
Table 2: Downloaded file timestamps for Google Drive, Microsoft Onedrive and Dropbox. 
Cloud Provider Last access time of 
the file 
Last modification 
time of the file. 
Last change time of 
the file inode data. 
Google Drive Upload time 
or 
Download time 
Upload time Download time 
Microsoft Onedrive Upload time 
or 
Download time 
Upload time Download time 
Dropbox Upload time 
or 
Download time 
Upload time Download time 
 
Overall, at the time of this dissertation, our research findings are precise but new releas-
es of client or API-based software may modify the way the files are uploaded or down-
loaded in future affecting the associated timestamps. Furthermore, service providers 
may alter the way date and time information related to files is stored, which may also 
impact the timestamp value that is created when downloading files from a cloud ac-
count. 
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5 Conclusions. 
Most people would agree that Information and Communications Technology (ICT) such 
as personal computers, laptops, smartphones, and tablets are essential to modern society 
and open the way for enhanced productivity, faster communication capabilities, and 
considerable convenience. Especially, the wide availability of online cloud storage is 
beneficial for individuals or enterprises because the cloud platform does not entail 
enormous investments, allows connecting and collaborating with clients and employees 
and provides less management and less supervision (04. Darren Quick, Ben Martini, 
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, 2014), (12.Ujwala, 2019). 
As a result, the discussion of this dissertation is primarily focused on the technical as-
pects of cloud evidence acquisition and not on its legal matters. Specifically, this re-
search contributes to cloud research and practice, as follows: 
• It is apparent that an investigation concerning criminal activity information hosted 
in a cloud storage platform, it may not be possible to follow a traditional methodol-
ogy based on cloud provider delivered data. Thus, additional research is required to 
invent effective methods to evaluate forensic findings in the cloud forensics pro-
cesses. Cloud computing is likely to result in a more sophisticated acquisition and 
analysis of digital evidence that they require more time and effort to accomplish. 
Moreover, Forensic investigators are obliged to acquire high level of knowledge in 
investigating the digital evidence in a cloud environment, as it can be considered as 
legal evidence in a Court of Law. 
• Studying previous and related work revealed that applications dedicated to remote 
data acquisition with forensically-sound characteristics are not widespread nowa-
days and general-purpose tools are used lacking fundamental forensics precautions 
such as read-only access, or precise audit trails features. This fact could be consid-
ered as a great opportunity for the exploration of application program interfaces ex-
posed by the cloud storage facilities and the development of specialized tools. 
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• We discussed that the switch from the sphere of software products (SaaP) to another 
one of software services (SaaS) requires a revising of all the fundamental concepts 
in digital forensics due to the fact that forensics of SaaP and SaaS are very different. 
Specifically, the existing set of forensics tools are quite insufficient for cloud stor-
age investigation because they are almost solely focused on the client-centric model 
and they seek to local storage as the primary source of evidence. However, the cloud 
drive acquisition cannot be performed on the client in a forensically safe manner be-
cause the client is not guaranteed to mirror all the data in the first place, and addi-
tionally has no capabilities to represent file revisions and the content of cloud-native 
artifacts. We cannot ignore issues like that the cloud service holds the complete state 
of the user-edited artifacts, and the local storage is essentially a cache of the evi-
dence data meaning that the use of traditional forensic tools in acquisition and anal-
ysis is essentially incomplete. 
• According to our research, a forensics investigator should always look for the most 
reliable data source which is the cloud service interfaces that are accessed at the 
lowest possible level via an API-centric approach, gaining an excessive amount of 
information. In this respect, the proper approach is to go directly to the source which 
is the master copy maintained by the cloud service and acquire the data via the API 
that allows for reproducibility of results, demanding tool testing and preliminary tri-
age of the data (via hashes and/or search query). Furthermore, the overall develop-
ment effort is drastically diminished as the entire blackbox reverse-engineering as-
pect of client-centric approach is eliminated. 
• We conducted an experiment to explore methods of acquiring cloud storage data by 
utilizing the API advantages and proposing an adaptable tool that allows us to col-
lect, organize, and preserve electronic evidence in a forensics safe way. Limitation 
factors such as that full synchronization and data downloading are potentially time 
consuming, the controversial two-way client-side synchronization and the economic 
cost were also considered. Thus, we introduced an implementation which can per-
form cloud drive acquisition from at least three popular service providers (Google 
Drive, Microsoft Onedrive and Dropbox) and the initial functionality tests confirm 
that it handles write protected access to selected remote folders while masking the 
differences existing in several cloud technologies. Particularly, our implementation 
scenario consists of collecting files from suspect’s three dummy cloud storage ac-
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counts with the aforementioned cloud service providers and storing a logical copy of 
all retrievable objects and their metadata to examiner’s Virtual Machine (VM) stor-
age facilities, hosted on Google Cloud infrastructure. Although our experiment’s 
primary purpose is to serve as a research platform, we expect that it eventually 
evolves into a reliable, open-source tool for a wide range of cloud services. 
• This research demonstrated that the file contents were not altered during the process 
of uploading, storing, and downloading files from cloud storage accounts with 
Google Drive, Microsoft Onedrive, and Dropbox, as the MD5 and SHA1 crypto-
graphic hash values were found intact. However, changes to the associated file 
timestamps were observed depending on the process undertaken and the cloud ser-
vice used, with the exception of the last written (modified) time which remained the 
same when downloading a file. This could result in implications in an investigation 
if incorrect assumptions are made based on the timestamp information only, and, 
hence, the method of acquiring the file should be additionally considered. 
• Because of the virtual, dynamic, and borderless nature of cloud computing, govern-
ment and law enforcement investigations concerning malicious cyber behaviors will 
require increased communication and cooperation between various government 
agencies from multiple countries. Government and law enforcement investigators 
face difficulties in accessing the physical hardware in order to locate evidential data 
because the latter is distributed to multiple data centers around the world. In legal 
terms, once recognition of a suspect cloud storage account is made, investigators 
can undertake a legal process via a service provider to secure data however this pro-
cess can potentially be problematic due to delays and legislation or jurisdictional is-
sues. 
In conclusion, this research has presented various topics and several problems concern-
ing the cloud technology that must be addressed by the digital forensics’ investigators. 
Taking everything into account, the necessity of developing specialized tools for acquir-
ing data evidence including cloud-native artifacts, is apparent. These tools should be 
based on a mechanism that ensures the integrity of the data acquired from all providers 
and handles multi-service cases in various implementation scenarios. Furthermore, de-
spite the fact that the development of such tools requires additional effort and time, the 
emphasis of logical acquisition which is presented in this dissertation, will eventually 
provide higher levels of automation in the acquisition and processing of forensic cloud 
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targets. Hopefully, it is expected that findings from this research will promote a new 
approach to cloud forensics and become of importance to forensic practitioners, as well 
as in criminal investigations and civil litigation matters. 
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